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1 Introduction
In a monetary union that faces nominal rigidities, asymmetric shocks across union members can-
not be oset by the common central bank. Lowering the policy interest rate to stimulate member
economies in recession runs the risk of overheating member economies at or above full employment
output. Optimal policy requires the central bank to stabilize union wide average ination, leaving a
combination of scal policy and nancial market integration to fulll the idiosyncratic stabilization
role that the central bank cannot play.1 While federations like the United States, Canada, the U.K.,
and Germany smooth over 80 percent of the impact of local shocks through a combination of scal
transfers and nancial market integration, the euro area only insures half that amount with no cen-
tralized scal authority or scal union and comparatively little transnational risk-sharing through
nancial markets (IMF (2013)).
The relative paucity of cross-border risk-sharing in the euro area has prompted much debate about
the need for a scal union between member states. However, there is still considerable uncertainty
about the optimal design as well as the potential welfare gains resulting from such a union. Much of
the academic research on scal unions has been conducted under the assumption of perfect cross-
country risk-sharing, usually for tractability sake, where full consumption insurance is provided
by internationally complete asset markets or by terms of trade movements.2 The potential welfare
gains from a scal union in these setups are very small, as the risk-sharing benets of integration
are nullied by assumption.
In contrast with the literature, we study the optimal design of a scal union in an open economy
model with incomplete cross-country risk-sharing. We dene a scal union as a revenue neutral
stabilization program, facilitated by cross-country transfers, that insures member states against the
vagaries of asymmetric shocks over the business cycle. We lay down a tractable model of a monetary
union composed of a continuum of small open economies which face incomplete nancial markets,
nominal rigidities and asymmetric shocks and solve for the optimal scal union analytically, and
then quantify the welfare gains from a scal union in a more general setup.
In the model there are two distortions that move allocations away from the Pareto optimum: a
labor wedge which reects deviations from the exible wage allocation and is proportional to the
output gap, and a consumption wedge which reects deviations from the complete markets alloca-
tion.3 The log-linearized labor wedge is zero in the exible wage allocation, while the log-linearized
consumption wedge is zero in the complete markets allocation. The labor wedge simply corresponds
1Beetsma and Jensen (2005), Gali and Monacelli (2008) and Ferrero (2009) show that monetary policy should stabilize
ination at the union level and that cooperative scal policy in the form of government spending has a country-
specic stabilization role.
2See for example Beetsma and Jensen (2005), Gali and Monacelli (2008), Ferrero (2009) and Farhi and Werning (2017).
3We abstract from terms of trade externalities, which arise from a country’s incentive to exploit monopoly power over
its export products, as these are not a primary concern for designing a scal union. Throughout the paper we focus
on cooperative allocations with steady state labor subsidies that remove the distortive impact of monopolistic steady
state markups on exports.
2
to the distance between the marginal cost and benet of labor in each country. Whenever the prod-
uct of the real wage and the marginal utility of consumption exceeds the marginal disutility of labor,
the labor wedge is positive. The consumption wedge corresponds to the eciency of the transfer al-
location. The marginal utility of the transfer is equal to the marginal utility of consumption divided
by the domestic consumer price index. In complete markets the marginal utility of an additional
transfer unit is equal across countries. If the marginal utility of an additional transfer unit is larger
than its average value in the union, the consumption wedge is positive.
We prove that the optimal transfer scheme stabilizes a weighted average of the labor and con-
sumption wedges, where the former enters with a weight equal to consumption home bias and the
latter one minus home bias (i.e. openness). As home bias increases, more income is spent on do-
mestically produced goods, such that transfers provide a larger boost to labor demand and are more
inuential in closing the labor wedge. Minimizing the labor wedge is thus more important for an
economy with a high proportion of domestic goods in the consumption basket. On the other hand, as
home bias shrinks, transfers have less impact on the labor wedge as more spending goes to imported
goods. In more open economies, the optimal transfer places relatively more weight on minimizing
the consumption wedge than the labor wedge. In general, the benet of scal transfers increases
with consumption home bias, as a larger proportion of transfer spending goes towards domestic
goods, thereby raising labor demand and shrinking the domestic output gap. A scal union is thus
more eective when home bias is strong.
In the limit, for a country with no home bias, we obtain a global closed-form solution to the model.
Transfers do not aect labor demand or domestic production in a fully open economy, as all income
is spent on imports. Although the labor wedge may generate large welfare losses, particularly when
domestic products are highly substitutable with foreign products, transfers are powerless to ame-
liorate this distortion when domestic households consume a basket of goods made up entirely of
imports. The optimal transfer scheme in a fully open economy thus focuses exclusively on mini-
mizing the consumption wedge and replicates the decentralized complete markets allocation.
Dierent from Farhi and Werning (2017), we solve for optimal transfers without restrictive as-
sumptions on household risk aversion or the substitutability of goods across countries — so-called
trade elasticities. Farhi and Werning employ the widely used Cole-Obstfeld (1991) calibration which
species log utility in consumption as well as unitary trade elasticities. Under this calibration full
consumption risk-sharing is provided by terms of trade movements, as export revenues are con-
stant in the presence of asymmetric productivity shocks due to osetting income and substitution
eects. While the Cole-Obstfeld/Farhi-Werning calibration is attractive for its analytical tractabil-
ity, it signicantly dampens the adverse impact of asymmetric productivity shocks on the labor and
consumption wedges.
As domestic goods become closer substitutes with foreign goods, a negative home productivity
shock leads to a larger decline in home exports in the absence of currency or wage adjustment,
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due to increased expenditure switching from home consumers. Larger export losses cause a greater
fall in labor demand and aggregate demand, which further diminishes labor and consumption and
raises their respective wedges. The Cole-Obstfeld/Farhi-Werning calibration mitigates this negative
feedback loop and the distortionary impact of higher product substitutability. Recent estimates
of aggregate trade elasticities for euro area countries fall in the range of three to ve (Corbo and
Osbat (2013), Imbs and Méjean (2015)). This has important implications for welfare, as higher export
substitutability (higher trade elasticity) increases the consumption and labor wedges, which raises
the cost of business cycle uctuations in a monetary union, and strengthens the need for a scal
union to oset the negative impacts of asymmetric shocks across countries.
To quantify the potential welfare gains from a scal union, we calibrate consumption home bias
and trade elasticities to recent empirical estimates for euro area countries in an extended version of
the model that includes imperfect cross-country risk-sharing, asymmetric shocks and Calvo wage
rigidity.4 We then solve for the optimal scal union numerically and demonstrate that the welfare
gains from optimal transfers are potentially much larger than previous studies, including Farhi and
Werning (2017), have documented. We conrm that transfers are more eective as home bias in-
creases and product substitutability rises. Indeed, the welfare gains from a transfer union under the
Cole-Obstfeld/Farhi-Werning calibration are extremely small, on the order of 0.01% of permanent
consumption, relative to the gains using country-specic elasticity estimates from the data, which
range from one to three percent of permanent consumption under incomplete markets. We also
show that business cycle uctuations in a monetary union are more costly by up to two orders of
magnitude relative to an identical closed or exible exchange rate economy. In contrast, welfare
losses are low regardless of openness or substitutability for countries outside a monetary union, as
exchange rate depreciation acts as an automatic stabilizer and signicantly dampens any drop in
domestic production.
Evers (2012) takes a more quantitative approach and estimates the welfare gains from a variety
of transfer rules within a monetary union. He uses numerical solution methods and does not solve
for the optimal transfer scheme explicitly. The distortions in his paper are fundamentally similar to
our setup: deviations from the output gap and underinsurance as well as wage and price dispersion,
both of which comove with the output gap. He also includes physical capital in his model, however
relative to our framework this does not add any new distortions nor alter the intuition for the role of
home bias or trade elasticities in the optimal transfer scheme. Evers (2012) nds that stabilizing labor
income is the optimal policy even though it generates high consumption and GDP volatility. This is
consistent with our results, as economies are relatively closed (home bias is 70%) in his calibration,
and we prove that optimal transfers focus on the labor wedge more than the consumption wedge
as home bias increases. In a similar setup to his 2012 paper, Evers (2015) studies the eectiveness
4Calvo wages introduce wage dispersion in addition to the consumption and labor wedges we discussed earlier. How-
ever, wage dispersion is proportional to the labor wedge.
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of various forms of scal federalism in a monetary union and, consistent with our ndings, shows
that relative to the decentralized allocation with incomplete nancial markets, a centralized trans-
fer union decreases the volatility of consumption, labor and output amongst member economies,
yielding positive welfare gains.
2 The Model With Wages Set One-Period-In-Advance
We consider a continuum of small open economies represented by the unit interval, as popularized in
the literature by Gali and Monacelli (2005, 2008). Our model is based on Dmitriev and Hoddenbagh
(2013), although here we consider wages rather than prices set one-period-in-advance, introduce
home bias, and focus on a monetary union instead of exible exchange rates.
Each economy consists of a representative household and a representative rm. All countries are
identical ex-ante: they have the same preferences, technology, and wage-setting. Ex-post, economies
will dier depending on the realization of their technology shock. Households are immobile across
countries, however goods can move freely across borders. Perfectly competitive rms in each econ-
omy produce a country-specic variety, which can be either consumed at home or exported as an
input in the foreign consumption basket. World demand for a country’s unique export good is neg-
atively sloped with a constant price elasticity, so that each economy exercises a degree of monopoly
power over its variety. As in Corsetti and Pesenti (2001, 2005) and Obstfeld and Rogo (2000, 2002),
we use one-period-in-advance wage setting to introduce nominal rigidities. Workers set next pe-
riod’s nominal wages, in terms of domestic currency, prior to next-period’s production and con-
sumption decisions. Given this preset wage, workers supply as much labor as demanded by rms.
We lay out a general framework below, and then hone in on the specic case of complete markets
and nancial autarky. To avoid additional notation, we ignore time subindices unless absolutely
necessary. When time subindices are absent, we are implicitly referring to period t.
Production Each economy i produces a nal good, which requires technology,Zi, and aggregated
labor, Ni. We assume that technology shocks are independent across time and across countries.
We need not impose any particular distributional requirement on technology at this point. The
production function of each economy will be:
Yi = ZiNi. (1)
Households, indexed by h, each have monopoly power over their dierentiated labor input, which
will lead to a markup on wages. A perfectly competitive, representative nal goods producer ag-
gregates dierentiated labor inputs from households in CES fashion into a nal good for export.
Production of the representative nal goods rm in a specic country is:
Ni =
(∫ 1
0
Ni(h)
ε−1
ε dh
) ε
ε−1
,
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where ε is the elasticity of substitution between dierent types of labor, and µε = εε−1 is the markup
on labor.
The aggregate labor cost index, W , dened as the minimum cost to produce one unit of output,
will be a function of the nominal wage for household h, W (h): Wi =
(∫ 1
0
Wi(h)
1−εdh
) 1
1−ε
. Cost
minimization by the rm leads to demand for labor from household h:
Ni(h) =
(
Wi(h)
Wi
)−ε
Ni. (2)
In the open economy, monopoly power is exercised at both the household and the country level:
at the household level because of dierentiated labor, and at the country level because each economy
produces a unique good. We show in Section 3 that optimizing cooperative policymakers will remove
the household markup on labor through the distribution of output subsidies. In addition, we assume
policymakers do not exploit the monopoly power over their country’s unique export variety, which
eliminates terms of trade externalities. Note that rms have no monopoly power and are perfectly
competitive in the model.
Households In each economy, there is a household, h, with lifetime expected utility
Et−1
{ ∞∑
k=0
βk
(
Cit+k(h)
1−σ
1− σ − χ
Nit+k(h)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
)}
(3)
where β < 1 is the household discount factor, C(h) is the consumption basket or index, N(h)
is household labor eort (think of this as hours worked), σ is the risk aversion parameter, and ϕ
is the inverse elasticity of labor supply. Households face a general budget constraint that nests
both complete markets and nancial autarky; we will discuss the dierences between the two in
subsequent sections. For now, it is sucient to simply write out the most general form of the budget
constraint:
Ci(h) = (1− τi)
(
Wi(h)
Pi(h)
)
Ni(h) +
Di(h)
Pi
+
Ti(h)
Pi
+ Γi(h). (4)
The distortionary tax rate on household labor income in country i is denoted by τi, while Γi is a
domestic lump-sum tax rebate to households. Ti refers to lump-sum cross-country transfers. In the
absence of a scal union, these cross-country transfers will equal zero (Ti = 0 ∀i). Net taxes equal
zero in the model, as any amount of government revenue is rebated lump-sum to households. The
consumer price index corresponds to Pi, while the nominal wage isWi. Di denotes state-contingent
portfolio payments expressed in real consumption units.
When international asset markets are complete, households perform all cross-border trades in
contingent claims in period 0, insuring against all possible states in all future periods. The transver-
6
ality condition simply states that all period 0 transactions must be balanced: payment for claims
issued must equal payment for claims received. The transversality condition for complete markets
is:
E0
{ ∞∑
t=0
βt
C−σit
Pit
Dit
}
= 0, (5)
while in nancial autarkyDit = 0. Intuitively, the transversality condition stipulates that the present
discounted value of future earnings should be equal to the present discounted value of future con-
sumption ows. Under complete markets, consumers choose a state contingent plan for consump-
tion, labor supply and portfolio holdings in period 0.
Consumption and Price Indices In each country i, the consumption basket consists of home
CH,i and foreign CF,i goods,
Ci =
[
(1− α) 1η (CH,i)
η−1
η + α
1
η (CF,i)
η−1
η
] η
η−1 (6)
where CF,i is dened as
CF,i =
(∫ 1
0
(CF,ij)
γ−1
γ dj
) γ
γ−1
. (7)
CH,i denotes consumption by households in country i of the domestically produced variety, while
CF,ij denotes consumption by households in country i of the variety produced by country j. The
elasticity of substitution between home and foreign products is dened by η, while the elasticity of
substitution between the goods of dierent countries is dened by γ. The relative weight of home
and foreign goods in the consumption basket is dened by the degree of home bias, 1 − α. When
α = 0, households only consume domestic goods, while when α = 1, the economy is fully open
and households consume a basket made up entirely of imports.
The domestic price index consists of the prices of both home and foreign products:
Pi =
[
(1− α)(PH,i)1−η + α(PF,i)1−η
] 1
1−η
. (8)
The relative demand for home and foreign products is given by
CH,i = (1− α)
(
PH,i
Pi
)−η
Ci, (9)
CF,i = α
(
PF,i
Pi
)−η
Ci. (10)
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The demand for country i′s production is
Yi = (1− α)
(
PH,i
Pi
)−η
Ci + α
(
PH,i/PF,i
)−γ ∫ 1
0
CF,jdj, (11)
while goods market clearing for country i’s unique variety is given by
Yi = CH,i +
∫ 1
0
CF,jidj. (12)
LaborMarket Clearing Households maximize lifetime utility (3) subject to the budget constraint
(4). The rst order condition for labor gives the labor supply condition (which is the optimal preset
wage):
Wit =
(
χµε
1− τi
)
Et−1
{
N1+ϕit
}
Et−1
{
C−σit Nit
Pit
} .
The representative rm in country i maximizes prot by choosing the appropriate amount of
aggregate labor, leading to the familiar labor demand condition equating the real wage at time t
(Wit/pit) with the marginal product of labor (Zit). To obtain the labor market clearing condition, set
labor demand equal to labor supply, and use the fact that the wage is preset at time t− 1:
1 =
(
χµε
1− τ
)
Et−1
{
N1+ϕit
}
Et−1
{
C−σit Yit
PH,it
Pit
} . (13)
Taking the expectations operator out of (13) yields the exible wage equilibrium.
Since shocks are independent across time and across countries, nominal preset wages are identical
across countries so we drop the country-specic subindex i for wages:
W =
(
χµε
1− τi
) Et−1 {N1+ϕit }
Et−1
{
C−σit Nit
Pit
} . (14)
Domestic prices are given by:
PH,i =
W
Zi
. (15)
We normalize the price of the foreign consumption basket to one, again ignoring the country-specic
subindex i as PF is identical across countries:
PF =
(∫ 1
0
P
γ−1
γ
H,i di
) γ
γ−1
= 1. (16)
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Given (15) and (16), we can express the nominal wage as a function of productivity in country i:
W =
(∫ 1
0
Z
γ−1
γ
i di
) γ
γ−1
. (17)
Complete Markets
In complete markets, agents in each economy have access to a full set of domestic and foreign state-
contingent assets. Households in all countries will maximize (3), choosing consumption, leisure,
and a complete set of state-contingent nominal bonds, subject to (4). Complete markets imply the
following risk-sharing condition:
C−σit
Pit
C−σit+1
Pit+1
=
C−σjt
Pjt
C−σjt+1
Pjt+1
∀i, j (18)
which states that the ratio of the marginal utility of consumption at time t and t+ 1 must be equal
across all countries. This condition does not imply that consumption is equal across countries.
Consumption in country i will depend on the initial asset position, scal policy, the distribution of
country-specic shocks, the covariance of global and local shocks, and other factors.5
When (5) and (18) hold, we obtain the following expression for consumption in country i:
Cit =
E0
{ ∞∑
t=1
βtYitPH,it
}
E0
{ ∞∑
t=1
βtP
σ−1
σ
it
} P− 1σit (19)
.
Financial Autarky
The aggregate resource constraint under nancial autarky species that the nominal value of output
in the home country must equal the nominal value of consumption in the home country:
Ci = Yi
PH,i
Pi
+
Ti
Pi
. (20)
Note that the sum of all transfers across countries in a given period must equal zero (
∫ Tidi = 0),
as the transfer scheme is revenue neutral in the aggregate. In the absence of a transfer union, there
will be no transfers (Ti = 0 ∀i).
5A policy change in economy i may lead to a change in consumption. For example, if the government taxes consump-
tion, households will consume less in the long-run relative to the rest of the world. In spite of this, it is still possible
to characterize an optimal consumption plan that is robust to changes in monetary and scal policy.
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3 Solving the Model
Ultimately, our goal is to study dierent institutional arrangements and evaluate the size of the
welfare costs of business cycles in each system in an eort to understand which distortions are most
critical and how they can be ameliorated via policy arrangements, either at the subnational, national
or international level.
We focus our attention here on two allocations. First, we examine the case of a monetary union
where countries have exible wages and access to complete markets, which coincides with the Pareto
optimum. Second, we deviate from the Pareto optimum and consider a currency union with incom-
plete cross-country risk-sharing, sticky wages and access to state-contingent transfers from a scal
union. In all allocations we assign cooperative steady-state production subsidies to oset monopo-
listic markups, thereby nullifying the negative welfare eect of terms of trade externalities.
Within a monetary union, a single central bank sets monetary policy for the union as a whole. In
the presence of aggregate shocks, the union-wide central bank will stabilize ination at the union
level, a result shown in Gali and Monacelli (2008). However, for tractability we assume no aggregate
shocks, only asymmetric country-specic shocks. With only one policy instrument, the union-wide
central bank cannot eliminate wage rigidity at the country level in the presence of asymmetric
shocks. As a result, the union-wide central bank does nothing in our model. None of our results
change if we add aggregate shocks: these shocks would simply be counteracted by the union-wide
central bank.
The Pareto Optimal Allocation
Proposition 1 The Decentralized Flexible Wage, Complete Markets Allocation The household
will maximize lifetime utility (3) subject to the budget constraint (4) and the transversality condition (5).
The decentralized allocation under exible wages, access to complete markets and cooperative steady-
state subsidies is given by
χNϕi
Zi
=
C−σi PH,i
Pi
, (21a)
C−σi
Pi
= constant, (21b)
as well as the domestic price index (8) and demand for the domestically produced variety (11).
Proof See Appendix A.1. 
Corollary 1. The Pareto Optimum The social planner will maximize the equally weighted joint
utility of all i countries in the monetary union,∫ 1
0
[
C1−σi
1− σ − χ
N1+ϕi
1 + ϕ
]
di (22)
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subject to the production function (1), the aggregate domestic consumption basket (6), the import bas-
ket (7), and goods market clearing (12). The solution to this maximization problem yields the Pareto
optimum, which corresponds to the decentralized exible wage, complete markets allocation with coop-
erative steady-state subsidies osetting monopolistic markups, given by (21a) and (21b).
Proof See Appendix A.2. 
Under the decentralized exible wage allocation households set their wages to equate the marginal
benet of working an additional hour with the marginal cost. From (21a), we see that the marginal
benet is equal to the product of the real wage and the marginal utility of consumption, while
the marginal cost corresponds to the disutility of labor. Under complete markets, households try
to equalize the marginal benet of contingent payments across states of the world. In doing so,
households aim to achieve two goals. First, they want to stabilize their consumption in a manner
proportional to their degree of risk aversion. Second, they prefer larger contingent claims in the
union currency whenever the domestic price index is relatively small so that they have more units
of consumption per unit of insurance.
Since the decentralized equilibrium with exible wages and cooperative subsidies optimally al-
locates labor in each period, and state-contingent securities provide full consumption insurance
against idiosyncratic productivity shocks, the exible wage allocation with internationally complete
asset markets is Pareto optimal.
The Monetary Union Allocation With Sticky Wages And Incomplete Markets
We now focus on allocations that deviate from the Pareto optimal allocation. In order to measure
the distance of any allocation from the Pareto optimal allocation, we introduce the labor wedge and
the consumption wedge below.
Denition of Labor and ConsumptionWedges Deviations from the Pareto optimal allocation can
bemeasured in the residual for the labor optimality condition, what we call the labor wedge VN,i, and the
residual for the consumption optimality condition, what we call the consumption wedge VC,i. Formally,
we dene the wedges as follows:
VN,i =
C−σi
ZiPH,i
Pi
χNϕi
(23)
VC,i =
C−σi
Pi
E
{C−σi
Pi
} (24)
VˆN,i = −ϕNˆi + Zˆi − σCˆi + PˆH,i − Pˆi (25)
VˆC,i = −σCˆi − Pˆi + σE{Cˆi}+ E{Pˆi} (26)
where VˆN,i and VˆC,i refer to the log-linear labor and consumption wedges respectively.
11
The log-linearized labor wedge is zero in exible wage allocations, while the log-linearized con-
sumption wedge is zero in complete markets allocations. Under the Pareto optimal allocation, both
the log-linearized labor and consumption wedges equal zero (VˆN,i = 0, VˆC,i = 0). The labor wedge
simply corresponds to the distance between the marginal cost and benet of labor in each coun-
try. Whenever the product of the real wage and the marginal utility of consumption exceeds the
marginal disutility of labor, the labor wedge is positive. Note that the labor wedge is proportional
to the domestic output gap. The consumption wedge corresponds to the eciency of the transfer
allocation. Under the optimal allocation, transfers should go to the country where one unit of trans-
fer generates the highest increase in consumption (which will correspond to those countries with a
low domestic price index in the monetary union) and thus delivers the highest marginal utility.
As we move into an examination of the optimal transfer scheme, we will call on the labor and
consumption wedges to provide intuition for our results. Below, we study allocations in a monetary
union with sticky wages, incomplete cross-country risk-sharing and cross-country scal transfers.
The consumption wedge will be non-zero in these allocations and will be aected by transfers.
Proposition 2 The Decentralized StickyWage, Incomplete Markets Allocation The equilibrium
for a member of a monetary union with sticky wages, no access to international nancial markets,
and access to cross-country transfers and steady state cooperative subsidies is described by domestic
production (1), the home price index (8), labor market clearing (13), the price of the home good (15),
the price index for foreign goods (16), the domestic real wage (17), and domestic consumption (20). The
allocation is given by
Ci = P
1−γ
H,i P
−η
i E{CiP ηi }+
1
α
P−ηi Ti, (27a)
Ni = P
−γ
H,iP
1−η
i Z
−1
i E{CiP ηi }+
1− α
α
P−ηH,iZ
−1
i Ti. (27b)
To the rst-order approximation, the above allocation can be expressed as:
Cˆi = (γ − 1 + η(1− α))Zˆi + 1
αCss
Tˆi, (28a)
Nˆi = (γ − 1 + (η − 1)(1− α))Zˆi + 1− α
αCss
Tˆi. (28b)
where Css is steady state consumption.
Proof See Appendix A.3. 
Under a transfer union, the volatility of consumption and labor increases in both trade elasticities
(η, γ) as long as products are substitutes rather than complements (i.e. as long as η and γ are greater
than one).6 As the domestic consumption basket becomes more heavily weighted to imported prod-
ucts (i.e. as α→ 1), consumption and labor become less sensitive to transfer income. In a fully open
6When home and foreign products are complements (η < 1), it is possible that hours worked will actually increase
in response to a negative idiosyncratic productivity shock. This would imply that, for example, countries on the
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economy, labor is completely insensitive to cross-country transfers. If goods are substitutes, open-
ness also decreases the volatility of consumption and labor with respect to asymmetric productivity
shocks.
In a monetary union with sticky wages, a fall in domestic productivity leads to a jump in the
price of domestically produced goods. The resulting decline in demand for domestic production is
stronger when home goods are more substitutable. Lower demand decreases consumption and hours
worked. The volatility of consumption and labor thus increases with product substitutability. Con-
sumption and hours worked are more insulated from asymmetric productivity shocks in economies
with a higher proportion of imports in the consumption basket due to a smaller multiplier eect. A
decline in exports leads to lower domestic aggregate demand, but in a very open economy domestic
demand does not impact domestic production very much as most domestic income is spent on im-
ports. Relative to economies with high consumption home bias, very open economies are heavily
dependent on export revenues, but are less negatively impacted by a collapse in domestic demand.
For the same reason, increasing openness diminishes the ability of transfers to mitigate the labor
wedge, as a larger portion of income is spent on imports rather than domestic goods.
Optimal Transfers
The optimal scal union enhances the welfare of member economies by minimizing the consumption
and labor wedges. However, since there is only one instrument for two wedges, the optimal transfer
scheme stabilizes a weighted average of the two wedges.
Proposition 3 Optimal Transfers Under the optimal transfer scheme, the policymaker maximizes
representative household utility (3) subject to the consumption allocation from (27a), the labor allocation
from (27b) and the optimal wage-setting condition (14). The requirement that all transfers add up to
zero is already implied in (27a) and (27b). The optimal transfer allocation for a member of a currency
union with sticky wages and incomplete markets is described by:
C−σi = (1− α)χNϕi P−ηH,tZ−1i P ηi + αχE{Nϕi P−γH,tZ−1i }P ηi , (29a)
Ni = (1− α)P−ηH,tZ−1i P ηi Ci + αP−γH,tZ−1i E{CiP ηi }. (29b)
To a rst-order approximation, the optimal transfer scheme sets a weighted average of the labor and
consumption wedges equal to zero:
(1− α)VˆN,i + αVˆC,i = 0. (30)
Proof See Appendix A.4. 
euro area periphery should have increased labor demand following negative productivity shocks. In the light of
high empirical estimates for trade elasticities and low labor demand for euro area periphery countries, we focus
mainly on calibrations where goods are substitutes. However, the analytical results hold whether home and foreign
products are substitutes or complements.
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The optimal transfer strategy for the union is to minimize the consumption wedge when the
economy is relatively open, and the labor wedge when the economy is relatively closed. This is
intuitive since transfers have a larger impact on labor demand in a relatively closed economy, as
additional spending is directed toward domestically produced goods, while in more open economies
most of the benets of higher aggregate demand are reected in higher imports. In an economy with
no home bias, the optimal transfer union replicates the decentralized complete markets allocation,
such that the log-linear consumption wedge will be zero. In such an economy, labor demand is
completely independent of the size of scal transfers, as all goods produced in the economy are
exported abroad, and the consumption basket is composed entirely of imported products.
4 Welfare Analysis In The Closed-Form Model With No Home Bias
We now analyze welfare across dierent allocations when economies have no consumption home
bias. This special case provides sharp analytical insights since we obtain a global closed-form solu-
tion for each allocation. Rather than approximating a quadratic welfare function around a particular
steady state, the advantage of the closed-form solution is that we can calculate welfare explicitly at
any steady state. Under no home bias, the optimal transfer union and the decentralized complete
markets allocations are identical since transfers in this scenario do not inuence the labor wedge
and thus policymakers focus only on minimizing the consumption wedge. The welfare analysis
conducted here also provides intuition about the eect of product substitutability on wedges and
welfare.
Our calibration for the closed-form model at quarterly frequency follows standard benchmarks
from the literature and is reported in Table 1. In our welfare analysis, we allow the trade elasticities
to vary while xing the other parameters of the model.
Expected Utilities
Below we calculate the log of expected utility for four allocations: exible wages with complete risk-
sharing (31a) or nancial autarky (31c); xed wages (i.e. sticky wages) with complete markets (31b)
or in nancial autarky (31d).7 Details on how we compute welfare analytically for each allocation are
found in Appendix B. We assume technology is log-normally distributed in all countries, log(Zi) ∼
7Note that the exible wage allocations also serve as a proxy for exible exchange rates. In Appendix B we show that,
for economies outside of a monetary union with a exible exchange rate, the central bank will conduct policy to
mimic the exible wage allocation when faced with idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
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N(0, σ2Z), and is independent across time and across countries.
logE
{
Uex complete
}
= log uss +
(γ − 1)(1− σ)(1 + ϕ)2
(1 + γϕ)(σ + ϕ)
σ2Z (31a)
logE
{
Uxed complete
}
= log uss +
(γ − 1)(1− σ)(1 + ϕ)(1 + ϕ− γϕ)
(σ + ϕ)
σ2Z (31b)
logE {Uex autarky} = log uss + (γ − 1)(1− σ)(1 + ϕ)
2 [1 + ϕ+ (γ − 1)(1− σ)(σ + ϕ)]
(σ + ϕ)[1− σ + γ(σ + ϕ)]2 σ
2
Z
(31c)
logE {Uxed autarky} = log uss + (γ − 1)(1− σ)(1 + ϕ) [1− (γ − 1)(σ + ϕ)]
σ + ϕ
σ2Z (31d)
Using these expected utilities, it is straightforward to show that: (1) improved risk-sharing always
has positive welfare consequences, (2) exible wages always have positive welfare consequences,
and (3) the gains from improved risk-sharing are always higher within a monetary union than out-
side of one.8 We also see that under the Cole-Obstfeld (1991) calibration with log utility and unitary
elasticity (σ = γ = 1), the expected utility for all policy coalitions is identical. In particular, uni-
tary elasticity leads to complete risk-sharing via terms of trade movements which stabilizes both
consumption and labor.
Figure 1 plots consumption in each allocation as a percentage of the Pareto optimum. The neg-
ative impact of the wage rigidity distortion dominates the negative impact of nancial autarky, as
both xed wage allocations perform quite poorly relative to the exible wage allocations, partic-
ularly as the degree of substitutability increases. The relative similarity of all exible wage allo-
cations (Flex Complete, Flex Autarky) is quite striking. Even in nancial autarky, exible wages
enable households to stabilize consumption with small movements in their labor hours. The benet
of consumption risk-sharing is thus very small when wages are exible. The gains from exible
wages approach 2% of permanent consumption under complete risk-sharing and 4% of permanent
consumption under nancial autarky for γ = 10. On the other hand, the welfare gains from perfect
risk-sharing via a transfer union or complete markets equal 2% of permanent consumption within
a monetary union when goods are highly substitutable (γ = 10).
5 Welfare Analysis In The Extended Model
In this section we quantify the potential welfare gains from a scal union in a model identical to the
one outlined in Section 2, except we employ Calvo wage rigidity rather than one-period-in-advance
wage ridigity and add a non-contingent safe government bond to the international nancial market.
The model presented here is laid out in detail in Appendix C. Calvo wage rigidity adds the distortive
impact of wage dispersion to the decentralized allocations. Wage dispersion comoves with the labor
8See Appendix B equations (B.15a) – (B.15d) for calculation of explicit welfare dierences.
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wedge, and thus increases the importance of minimizing the labor wedge relative to the consumption
wedge in the optimal transfer union.
We calibrate the extended model at quarterly frequency. All parameter values are found in Table
1. The elasticity of substitution between home and foreign products is dened by η, while the
elasticity of substitution between the goods of dierent countries remains γ. The relative weight
of these goods in the consumption basket is dened by the degree of home bias, 1 − α. When
α = 0, households only consume domestic goods, while when α = 1, the economy is fully open
and households will consume a basket made up entirely of imports from all other countries in the
world. The strength of wage rigidity is dened by θW , the fraction of households who are able to
reset wages in each period. We consider three primary settings for Calvo wage rigidity: exible
wages (θW = 0), low wage rigidity (θW = 0.75) which implies that the average household resets
wages once every four quarters, and high wage rigidity θW = 0.87 which implies that the average
household resets wages every two years.9
We calculate the welfare losses from business cycle uctuations in four dierent allocations: -
nancial autarky, incomplete markets and complete markets in the absence of a scal union, and
nally under the optimal transfer scheme. To conduct these welfare comparisons across dierent
allocations, we follow Lucas (2003) and estimate the utility from a deterministic consumption path
and a risky consumption path with the same mean. We calculate the amount of consumption neces-
sary to make a risk-averse household indierent between the deterministic and risky consumption
streams. As we have done throughout the paper, in all allocations we remove terms of trade exter-
nalities through cooperative output subsidies so that there are no steady state markups on exports.
Figure 2 plots the loss in permanent consumption from business cycle uctuations in nancial
autarky for high wage rigidity (θW = 0.87). In this environment, home bias lowers welfare for every
value of the trade elasticity for domestic exports γ. The losses in permanent consumption in nancial
autarky in a currency union are as high as 16% when economies are completely open (α = 1) and 17%
under full home bias (α→ 0) when trade elasticity is very high (γ = 10). In a fully open economy,
the decline in exports and income leads to a decrease in consumption and increases the consumption
wedge, this consumption decline causes no further eect on income and labor wedge as the latter
is derived from export. On the other hand, in the presence of home bias the consumption wedge
and labor wedge become more related, as decline in consumption drives domestic production down
and kickstarts a standard Keynesian multiplier eect between consumption and income. Thus, the
volatility of business cycles grow with higher home bias.
9We take θW = 0.75 as a conservative estimate of wage rigidity from Basu, Barattieri, and Gottschalk (2014), who nd
strong empirical evidence for θW in the range of 0.75 and 0.8 using U.S. micro data. Even θW = 0.87 is a relatively
conservative parameterization given recent estimates by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012). They nd very strong
downward wage rigidity in a number of countries in Europe from 2008-2011, including Greece, Portugal, and Spain.
Although wages are more exible in the upward direction, our focus here is on the negative eect of downward
wage rigidity and the large welfare losses that accrue in a currency union under this scenario. Cacciatore, Ghironi
and Fiori (2015) show that labor market reforms which reduce downward wage rigidity in a monetary union provide
large welfare gains.
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Figure 3 plots the loss in permanent consumption from business cycle uctuations in incomplete
markets. The ability to trade safe government bonds greatly improves welfare for countries in a
currency union who are exposed to asymmetric shocks. Dierent from nancial autarky, an in-
crease in home bias improves the ability of countries to stabilize business cycles when markets are
incomplete precisely because the consumption wedge and the labor wedge become more related.
If a country is completely open, negative productivity shocks generate capital inows which sta-
bilize household income and consumption, thereby shrinking the consumption wedge. However,
positive capital inows will have no impact on hours worked or domestic output in a fully open
economy, as all income is spent on imports. The labor wedge thus increases, as domestic production
is sold exclusively abroad as exports, and exports become uncompetitive. Under incomplete mar-
kets, stronger home bias acts as a stabilizing force for consumption and hours worked, and shrinks
both the consumption and labor wedges because rms supply more goods to the home market and
thus an increase in domestic income and consumption through capital inows also stabilizes labor
and output.
The welfare losses arising from business cycle uctuations under the optimal transfer structure
are shown in Figure 4. Qualitatively, the economy in a scal union performs in a similar man-
ner to the incomplete markets case. Optimal transfers deliver higher welfare gains for relatively
closed economies with a higher elasticity of substitution. Transfers stabilize consumption, which
lowers labor volatility particularly for countries that consume a high proportion of domestically
produced goods. Quantitatively the optimal transfer union delivers higher welfare gains than in-
complete markets. While households try to stabilize their consumption and maximize risk-sharing
under incomplete markets, optimal transfers improve welfare by focusing on the tradeo between
the labor and consumption wedges. For example, in response to a negative shock transfers may
increase consumption more than is necessary for the provision of full consumption insurance, in
order to stabilize labor volatility. In other words, the social planner recognizes the demand exter-
nality arising from increased household consumption, which decreases wage rigidity and produces
increased labor demand for other households. Overall, a scal union can successfully address asym-
metric productivity shocks for suciently closed economies even when trade elasticities are high,
since transfers are more eective in mitigating the labor wedge as economies become less open.
However, very open economies with highly substitutable exports remain vulnerable to the threat of
asymmetric productivity shocks in a monetary union. Their welfare losses can be large even under
the optimal transfer structure, as their labor wedge is relatively insulated from the impact of transfer
income.
As a robustness check, we plot the loss in permanent consumption from business cycle uctua-
tions in nancial autarky for varying levels of Calvo wage rigidity in Figure 5. We set consumption
home bias equal to the euro area average of 65% (i.e. (1 − α) = 0.65). Again, we see that it is
not only wage rigidity that leads to large welfare losses, but the combination of wage rigidity and
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high trade elasticities, as both factors increase labor wedge. Simply put, when a country in a mon-
etary union produces exports that are easily substitutable, the welfare consequences are dramatic.
Coupled with rigid wages, as the evidence in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2011) suggests for some
European countries, the losses in permanent consumption are small for low subsitutability but quite
large under high substitutability. Even for conservative estimates of wage rigidity, the losses in
permanent consumption are considerable for high trade elasticities.
Overall, we show that as home bias increases, the consumption and labor wedges become more
strongly related. Higher wage rigidity strengthens the labor wedge for all allocations, while higher
trade elasticities strengthen both the consumption and labor wedges. Higher home bias under -
nancial autarky has a destabilizing eect as growing labor and consumption wedges reinforce each
other. On the other hand, under incomplete markets, complete markets and the optimal transfer
union, home bias is welfare enhancing as a more stable consumption wedge through capital inows
also stabilizes domestic output and labor.
Welfare Losses for Country-Specific Elasticity Estimates
We compute the welfare losses from business cycles for a number of European countries under nan-
cial autarky, incomplete markets, complete markets and the optimal transfer union resulting from 1%
technology shocks. We consider three dierent values for Calvo wage rigidity in our computations:
high wage rigidity (θW = 0.87), low wage rigidity (θW = 0.75) and exible wages (θW = 0). Table 2
reports the loss in permanent consumption for the country-specic elasticity estimates of Corbo and
Osbat (2013), while Table 3 reports the results for the country-specic elasticity estimates of Imbs
and Méjean (2010). The results are particularly striking for countries in nancial autarky with high
trade elasticities, where the losses are as high as 7.22% (Greece). Access to a non-contingent bond
for households signicantly improves welfare, as permanent consumption losses drop to a range of
1.19% (Slovakia) to 2.88% (Austria) under high wage rigidity. Moving from incomplete markets to
complete markets yields a smaller welfare gain of between 0.5 to 2 percent of permanent consump-
tion for most countries in the sample. A transfer union is the most ecient allocation, as losses
range from 0% (Italy) to 0.56% (Czech Republic). Consistent with our intuition from the baseline
model, the welfare losses under the optimal transfer union increase with an economy’s openness
and the substitutability of its exports, as the labor wedge becomes less aected by transfers.
In Table 4 we compute the welfare losses in incomplete markets resulting from productivity
shocks calibrated to match the volatility and autocorrelation of output in the data. The autocorrela-
tion of HP-ltered output (ρY ) in the data is approximately 0.9998. We conservatively set ρZ = 0.99
for our simulations which implies ρY = 0.99 in the model; if we increase ρZ , the welfare losses also
increase. The volatility of productivity shocks (σZ,1, σZ,2) are calibrated to match the volatilities
of HP-ltered output (σY,1, σY,2). We conduct welfare analysis for two scenarios. In Scenario 1 we
take the volatility of output (σY,1) from HP-ltered GDP data for each country with no adjustments
and calibrate productivity shocks (σZ,1) to match the output volatilities from the data. In Scenario
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2 we compute the volatility of output (σY,2) from HP-ltered GDP data for each country after sub-
tracting euro area GDP in order to construct a valid measure of asymmetric productivity shocks.
We then calibrate the volatility of asymmetric productivity shocks (σZ,2) to match the volatility of
asymmetric output in the data (σY,2). The volatility of output resulting from asymmetric shocks
(σY,2) is roughly half of the overall volatility of output for each country (σY,1). Scenario 1 may be
thought of as a set of upper bound estimates and Scenario 2 as a set of lower bound estimates of
empirically plausible welfare losses resulting from the absence of perfect cross-country risk sharing
in a monetary union, where a common central bank cannot respond to asymmetric shocks across
countries. The countries with the largest to gain from a transfer union are the smaller “periphery”
countries, including Greece, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Portugal and Slovakia.
These results on the welfare gains of a transfer union over and above the complete markets allo-
cation are consistent with the intuition we gleaned from the baseline model in Section (2), as well
as with Farhi and Werning (2017), as we show that the privately optimal allocation under complete
markets is inecient and can be improved upon by government intervention in the form of scal
transfers between countries. We then explicitly quantify the country-specic welfare gains from
transfers without restricting ourselves to the Cole-Obstfeld calibration. Using country-specic cal-
ibrations, we document economically signicant gains for a number euro area economies, particu-
larly for those with little access to international nancial markets and highly substitutable export
products. Greece is a prime example of both.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we build a tractable model of a monetary union that faces nominal rigidities, imperfect
risk-sharing across countries and asymmetric shocks and solve for the optimal scal union analyti-
cally, and then quantify the welfare gains from a scal union in a more general setup. In the model
there are two distortions: a labor wedge which reects deviations from the exible wage allocation
due to nominal rigidites and is proportional to the output gap, and a consumption wedge which re-
ects deviations from the complete markets allocation. We prove that the optimal transfer scheme
stabilizes a weighted average of the labor and consumption wedges, where the former enters with a
weight equal to consumption home bias and the latter one minus home bias (i.e. openness). As home
bias increases, more income is spent on domestically produced goods, such that transfers provide a
larger boost to labor demand and are more inuential in closing the labor wedge. Minimizing the
labor wedge is thus more important for an economy with a high proportion of domestic goods in
the consumption basket. In general, the benet of scal transfers increases with consumption home
bias, as a larger proportion of transfer spending goes towards domestic goods, thereby raising labor
demand and shrinking the domestic output gap. A scal union is thus more eective when home
bias is strong.
To quantify the potential welfare gains from a scal union, we calibrate consumption home bias
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and trade elasticities to recent empirical estimates for euro area countries in an extended version of
the model that includes imperfect cross-country risk-sharing, asymmetric shocks and Calvo wage
rigidity. We then solve for the optimal scal union numerically and demonstrate that the welfare
gains from optimal transfers are potentially much larger than previous studies, including Farhi and
Werning, have documented. We conrm that transfers are more eective as home bias increases
and as product substitutability rises. Indeed, the welfare gains from a transfer union under the
Cole-Obstfeld/Farhi-Werning calibration are extremely small, on the order of 0.01% of permanent
consumption, relative to the gains using country-specic elasticity estimates from the data, which
range from one to three percent of permanent consumption under incomplete markets. We also
show that business cycle uctuations in a monetary union are more costly by up to two orders of
magnitude relative to an identical closed or exible exchange rate economy. In contrast, welfare
losses are low regardless of openness or substitutability for countries outside a monetary union, as
exchange rate depreciation acts as an automatic stabilizer and signicantly dampens any drop in
domestic production.
20
Table 1: Calibration of the Closed-Form and Extended Models
Parameter Value Description
σ 2 Risk aversion parameter
ϕ 3 Inverse labor supply elasticity (Gali and Monacelli (2005, 2008))
χ 1 Following Gali and Monacelli (2005, 2008)
ε 6 Elasticity between dierent types of labor
θW Varies Calvo parameter for wage rigidity
β 0.99 Household discount factor
γ Varies Elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods
α Varies Openness
η 1 Elasticity between home and foreign goods in extended model
ρZ 0.95 Persistence of technology shock in extended model
σZ 0.01 Standard deviation of technology
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Table 2: Losses in Permanent Consumption for Country-Specic Elasticity Estimates of Corbo & Osbat (2013)
Parameters High Wage Rigidity (θW = 0.87) Low Wage Rigidity (θW = 0.75) Flex Wages (θW = 0)
Fin. Incomp. Complete Transfer Fin. Incomp. Complete Transfer Fin. Incomp.
α η γ Autarky Markets Markets Union Autarky Markets Markets Union Autarky Markets
Austria 0.55 4.5 3.8 6.05 2.88 2.09 0.37 2.76 1.41 1.08 0.33 0.032 0.011
Czech 0.70 3.4 3.8 5.13 2.86 2.21 0.56 2.40 1.41 1.13 0.47 0.029 0.010
Denmark 0.40 3.3 3.4 5.48 1.88 1.08 0.06 2.54 0.94 0.58 0.06 0.033 0.014
Finland 0.32 3.5 3.4 5.83 1.64 0.81 0.02 2.68 0.82 0.44 0.02 0.034 0.016
France 0.31 3.7 3.8 6.38 1.82 0.95 0.03 2.88 0.91 0.51 0.03 0.035 0.016
Germany 0.34 3.7 4.3 6.75 2.18 1.27 0.07 3.02 1.08 0.68 0.07 0.035 0.015
Greece 0.35 2.9 4.1 6.06 1.90 1.06 0.04 2.76 0.95 0.57 0.04 0.035 0.015
Hungary 0.49 3.3 4.2 6.06 2.62 1.80 0.23 2.76 1.29 0.94 0.21 0.033 0.013
Italy 0.22 3.2 3.2 5.67 1.01 0.30 0.00 2.61 0.51 0.17 0.00 0.036 0.019
Netherlands 0.62 3.5 3.5 5.07 2.55 1.85 0.34 2.38 1.26 0.96 0.30 0.029 0.010
Portugal 0.41 3.3 3.9 5.97 2.18 1.34 0.10 2.73 1.08 0.71 0.09 0.034 0.014
Slovakia 0.30 3.7 3.9 6.50 1.81 0.93 0.03 2.92 0.90 0.50 0.02 0.035 0.016
Spain 0.30 3.4 3.2 5.61 1.44 0.65 0.01 2.59 0.72 0.35 0.01 0.035 0.017
Sweden 0.42 4.2 4.5 6.97 2.77 1.87 0.21 3.09 1.36 0.97 0.20 0.034 0.013
UK 0.37 2.9 3.0 4.84 1.45 0.71 0.02 2.29 0.73 0.39 0.02 0.033 0.015
Europ. Avg 0.35 3.5 3.7 6.05 1.90 1.05 0.05 2.76 0.95 0.56 0.04 0.034 0.015
We compute the welfare losses in percent from a one percent technology shock (σZ = 0.01, ρZ = 0.95). We follow Lucas (2003) and estimate the utility from a deterministic
consumption path and a risky consumption path with the same mean. We then calculate the amount of consumption necessary to make a risk averse household indierent
between the deterministic and risky consumption streams. The result is the loss in permanent consumption in percentage points for four scenarios: autarky, incomplete
markets, complete markets, and a transfer union. There is no steady state terms of trade markup here. Openness (α) is taken from Balta and Delgado (2009). The elasticity
of substitution between home and foreign products (η) and the elasticity of substitution between the products of dierent countries (γ) for European countries is taken from
Table 4 and 5 of Corbo and Osbat (2013).
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Table 3: Losses in Permanent Consumption for Country-Specic Elasticity Estimates of Imbs and Méjean (2010)
Parameters High Wage Rigidity (θW = 0.87) Low Wage Rigidity (θW = 0.75) Flex Wages (θW = 0)
Fin. Incomp. Complete Transfer Fin. Incomp. Complete Transfer Fin. Incomp.
α η γ Autarky Markets Markets Union Autarky Markets Markets Union Autarky Markets
Austria 0.55 1.9 3.9 4.94 2.21 1.50 0.18 2.33 1.10 0.79 0.16 0.031 0.012
Finland 0.32 3.5 3.4 5.81 1.63 0.81 0.02 2.67 0.81 0.44 0.02 0.034 0.016
France 0.31 3.1 3.5 5.70 1.53 0.72 0.01 2.63 0.76 0.39 0.01 0.035 0.016
Germany 0.34 3.5 3.8 6.19 1.91 1.05 0.04 2.81 0.95 0.56 0.04 0.035 0.015
Greece 0.35 4.8 4.2 7.22 2.48 1.53 0.12 3.18 1.22 0.80 0.11 0.035 0.015
Hungary 0.49 2.4 3.1 4.32 1.66 0.98 0.07 2.08 0.84 0.53 0.06 0.030 0.013
Italy 0.22 3.9 3.8 6.71 1.36 0.52 0.00 3.00 0.68 0.29 0.00 0.036 0.019
Portugal 0.41 3.6 4.9 6.99 2.73 1.82 0.19 3.10 1.33 0.95 0.18 0.035 0.014
Slovakia 0.30 3.2 2.7 4.99 1.19 0.47 0.00 2.35 0.60 0.26 0.00 0.034 0.017
Spain 0.30 3.5 4.4 6.80 1.95 1.04 0.03 3.03 0.97 0.56 0.03 0.036 0.016
Sweden 0.42 3.2 4.0 6.01 2.25 1.41 0.11 2.74 1.11 0.74 0.11 0.034 0.014
UK 0.37 3.2 3.6 5.65 1.82 1.00 0.04 2.61 0.91 0.54 0.04 0.034 0.015
European Avg 0.35 3.3 3.8 6.05 1.90 1.05 0.05 2.76 0.95 0.56 0.04 0.034 0.015
We compute the welfare losses in percent from a one percent technology shock (σZ = 0.01, ρZ = 0.95). We follow Lucas (2003) and estimate the utility from a deterministic
consumption path and a risky consumption path with the same mean. We then calculate the amount of consumption necessary to make a risk averse household indierent
between the deterministic and risky consumption streams. The result is the loss in permanent consumption in percentage points for four scenarios: autarky, incomplete
markets, complete markets, and a transfer union. There is no steady state terms of trade markup here. Openness (α) is taken from Balta and Delgado (2013). The elasticity
of substitution between home and foreign products (η) and the elasticity of substitution between the products of dierent countries (γ) for European countries is taken from
Imbs and Méjean (2010).
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Table 4: Losses in Permanent Consumption in Incomplete Markets from Productivity Shocks Calibrated to the Data
Data Corbo & Osbat (2013) Imbs & Méjean (2010)
α σY,1 σY,2 η γ σZ,1 Losses σZ,2 Losses η γ σZ,1 Losses σZ,2 Losses
Austria 0.55 0.013 0.005 4.5 3.8 0.010 1.087 0.004 0.147 1.9 3.9 0.011 0.982 0.004 0.132
Czech 0.70 0.019 0.010 3.4 3.8 0.015 2.065 0.007 0.514
Denmark 0.40 0.015 0.007 3.3 3.4 0.013 1.318 0.006 0.291
Finland 0.32 0.021 0.010 3.5 3.4 0.018 2.500 0.008 0.562 3.5 3.4 0.018 2.502 0.008 0.561
France 0.31 0.010 0.005 3.7 3.8 0.008 0.576 0.004 0.142 3.1 3.5 0.008 0.542 0.004 0.133
Germany 0.34 0.017 0.006 3.7 4.3 0.014 1.790 0.005 0.207 3.5 3.8 0.014 1.722 0.005 0.198
Greece 0.35 0.024 0.024 2.9 4.1 0.020 3.393 0.020 3.340 4.8 4.2 0.019 3.681 0.019 3.633
Hungary 0.49 0.017 0.010 3.3 4.2 0.013 1.767 0.008 0.629 2.4 3.1 0.014 1.458 0.008 0.521
Italy 0.22 0.014 0.004 3.2 3.2 0.012 0.954 0.003 0.079 3.9 3.8 0.011 1.050 0.003 0.087
Netherlands 0.62 0.013 0.005 3.5 3.5 0.010 0.987 0.004 0.141
Portugal 0.41 0.013 0.011 3.3 3.9 0.010 1.006 0.009 0.750 3.6 4.9 0.010 1.081 0.009 0.811
Slovakia 0.30 0.023 0.014 3.7 3.9 0.019 3.020 0.012 1.200 3.2 2.7 0.019 2.600 0.012 1.033
Spain 0.30 0.012 0.007 3.4 3.2 0.010 0.848 0.006 0.291 3.5 4.4 0.010 0.941 0.006 0.323
Sweden 0.42 0.019 0.009 4.2 4.5 0.014 2.168 0.007 0.505 3.2 4.0 0.015 2.016 0.007 0.470
UK 0.37 0.014 0.008 2.9 3.0 0.011 0.936 0.006 0.299 3.2 3.6 0.011 1.030 0.006 0.326
European Avg 0.35 0.013 0.000 3.5 3.7 0.010 0.978 0.000 0.000 3.3 3.8 0.011 0.982 0.000 0.000
Here we compute the welfare losses in incomplete markets resulting from productivity shocks calibrated to match the volatility and autocorrelation of output in the data.
The autocorrelation of HP-ltered output (ρZ ) in the data is approximately 0.9998, so we set ρZ = 0.99 for the simulations above. The volatility of productivity shocks (σZ,1,
σZ,2) are calibrated to match the volatilities of HP-ltered output (σY,1, σY,2). In Scenario 1 we take the volatility of output (σY,1) from HP-ltered GDP data for each country
with no adjustments and calibrate productivity shocks (σZ,1) to match the output volatilities from the data. In Scenario 2 we compute the volatility of output (σY,2) from
HP-ltered GDP data for each country after subtracting euro area GDP in order to construct a valid measure of asymmetric productivity shocks. We then calibrate the volatility
of asymmetric productivity shocks (σZ,2) to match the volatility of asymmetric output in the data (σY,2). We follow Lucas (2003) and estimate the utility from a deterministic
consumption path and a risky consumption path with the same mean. We then calculate the amount of consumption necessary to make a risk averse household indierent
between the deterministic and risky consumption streams: the result is the losses in permanent consumption in percentage points. There is no steady state terms of trade
markup here. Openness (α) is taken from Balta and Delgado (2009). The elasticity of substitution between home and foreign products (η) and the elasticity of substitution
between the products of dierent countries (γ) for European countries is taken from Corbo and Osbat (2013) and from Imbs and Méjean (2010).
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Figure 1: Welfare Losses from Business Cycle Fluctuations in the Closed-Form Model
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Figure 2: Welfare Losses from Business Cycle Fluctuations in Financial Autarky
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Figure 3: Welfare Losses from Business Cycle Fluctuations in Incomplete Markets
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Figure 4: Welfare Losses from Business Cycle Fluctuations in a Transfer Union
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Figure 5: Welfare Losses from Business Cycle Fluctuations in Financial Autarky for Dierent Levels
of Wage Rigidity
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For Online Publication: Technical Appendix
A Proof of Main Propositions
A.1 ProofofProposition 1: TheDecentralizedFlexibleWage, CompleteMarkets
Allocation
The household in country i will maximize lifetime utility (3), subject to a simplied version of the
household budget constraint and the transversality condition:
Ci(st)Pi(st) = Wi(st)Ni(st) +Di(st), (A.1)
E0
{ ∞∑
t=1
qi(st)Di(st)
}
= 0. (A.2)
Dij(st) denotes the state-contingent bond that pays in currency j in state st; qj(st) is the price of that
bond in period 0 (when all trading occurs), where qj(st) is arbitrary up to a constant. The household
in period 0 cares about the relative price of claims across states and currencies. The transversality
condition stipulates that all period 0 transactions must be balanced: payment for claims issued must
equal payment for claims received. The household Lagrangian is:
Li =
∞∑
t=1
βtE0
{
Ui(C(st))− Vi(N(st)) + λi(st)
Pi(st)
[
Wi(st)Ni(st) +Di(st)− Ci(st)Pi(st)
]}
− λi0
∞∑
t=1
E0
{
q(st)Di(st)
}
. (A.3)
Now take the FOC with respect to state contingent bonds Di(st):
∂Li
∂Di(st)
= λi0q(st) +
βtλi(st)
Pi(st)
= 0, (A.4)
which gives the price of the state-contingent bond,
qi(st) = β
tλi(st)
λi0
1
Pi(st)
.
Substituting the above equation into (A.2) we can express the transversality condition as equation
(5) in the text, which for reference sake is below:
E0
{ ∞∑
t=1
βt
C−σit
Pit
Dit
}
= 0.
Notice that the price of qi(st) does not depend on country i. In this case we get the risk-sharing
condition
λi(st)
λi0
1
Pi(st)
=
λj(st)
λj0
1
Pj(st)
, (A.5)
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which implies
C−σi (st)
Pi(st)
= constant.
When PPP holds (e.g. when there is no home bias), Pi(st)
Pj(st)
= 1, and the risk-sharing condition
simplies to λi(st)
λj(st)
=
(
Ci(st)
Cj(st)
)−σ
= λi0
λj0
. When the consumption ratio is constant across countries,
Cit = AiPi(st)
− 1
σ .
In order to solve for Ai, we substitute (A.1) into the transversality condition,
∞∑
t=1
E0
{
q(st)Di(st)
}
=
∞∑
t=1
E0
{
βt
Ci(st)
−σ
Pi(st)
(
Ci(st)Pi(st)−Wi(st)Ni(st)
)}
= 0
and simplify the above expression to obtain
∞∑
t=1
βtE0
{
C1−σi (st)
}
=
∞∑
t=1
βtE0
{
Ci(st)
−σWi(st)
Pi(st)
Ni(st)
}
.
Now we can extract and cancel out C−σi (st)Pi(st):
∞∑
t=1
βtE0
{
Ci(st)Pi(st)
}
=
∞∑
t=1
βtE0
{
Wi(st)Ni(st)
}
.
Since Ci = AP
− 1
σ
i , we can plug it into the transversality condition and obtain
Ci =
∞∑
t=1
βtE0
{
Wi(st)Ni(st)
}
∞∑
t=1
βtE0
{
Pi(st)
σ−1
σ
} P− 1σi =
∞∑
t=1
βtE0
{
Yi(st)PH,i(st)
}
∞∑
t=1
βtE0
{
Pi(st)
σ−1
σ
} P− 1σi , (A.6)
which can be simplied to (19).
To solve for (21a), the household maximizes lifetime utility (3) subject to the budget constraint
(4) and the labor demand condition (2). The solution to the household’s constrained maximization
problem is:
Nϕi = χ
Wi
Pi
C−σi . (A.7)
Using the production function (1) and the expression for the domestic price level in terms of the
nominal wage and productivity (15), we obtain the simplied expression
Y ϕi Z
1−ϕ
i = χC
−σ
i
PH,i
Pi
. (A.8)

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A.2 Proof of Corollary 1: The Pareto Optimal Allocation
The social planner maximizes the sum of household utility across all i economies∫ 1
0
[
C1−σi
1− σ − χ
N1+ϕi
1 + ϕ
]
di (A.9)
subject to the production constraint (1), the aggregate domestic consumption basket (6), the con-
sumption index for foreign goods (7), and goods market clearing (12):
Yi = ZiNi
Ci =
[
(1− α) 1ηC
η−1
η
H,i + α
1
ηC
η−1
η
F,i
] η
η−1
CF,i =
(∫ 1
0
C
γ−1
γ
F,ij dj
) γ
γ−1
Yi = CH,i +
∫ 1
0
CF,jidj.
We can plug in all of these constraints to the objective function and solve the following uncon-
strained maximization problem:
max
CH,i,CFij
∫ 1
0
[[(1− α) 1ηC η−1ηH,i + α 1η ( ∫ 10 C γ−1γF,ij dj) γγ−1 η−1η ]
η(1−σ)
η−1
1− σ − χ
(
CH,i +
∫ 1
0
CF,jidj
)1+ϕ
Z1+ϕi (1 + ϕ)
]
di.
(A.10)
The rst order conditions with respect to CF,ji and CH,i are
∂U
∂CF,ji
= α
1
ηC−σj C
1
η
j C
− 1
η
F,j C
1
γ
F,jC
− 1
γ
F,ji − χY ϕi Z−(1+ϕ)i = 0,
∂U
∂CH,i
= (1− α) 1ηC−σi C
1
η
i C
− 1
η
H,i − χY ϕi Z−(1+ϕ)i = 0.
We rearrange these equations by substituting out the term χY ϕi Z
−(1+ϕ)
i and obtain:
α
1
η (1− α)− 1ηC−σj C
1
η
j C
− 1
η
F,j C
1
γ
F,jC
σ
i C
− 1
η
i C
1
η
H,i = C
1
γ
F,ji. (A.11)
Now we integrate the left hand side and the right hand side of the above equation across i by using
CF,j = (
∫ 1
0
C
γ−1
γ
F,ji di)
γ
γ−1 :
α
1
η (1− α)− 1ηC−σj C
1
η
j C
− 1
η
F,j C
1
γ
F,j
(∫ 1
0
C
σ γ−1
γ
i C
− 1
η
γ−1
γ
i C
1
η
γ−1
γ
H,i di
) γ
γ−1
= C
1
γ
F,j.
The above is equivalent to the complete markets condition:
Cσj α
− 1
ηC
− 1
η
j C
1
η
F,j = (1− α)−
1
η
(∫ 1
0
C
σ γ−1
γ
i C
− 1
η
γ−1
γ
i C
1
η
γ−1
γ
H,i di
) γ
γ−1
. (A.12)
Now, we derive the expression for total exports from country i:
∫ 1
0
CF,jidj. To nd CF,ji we use
30
  
 
 
ADEMU WORKING PAPER SERIES 
 
Optimal fiscal transfers in a monetary union 
Mikhail Dmitriev† 
Jonathan HoddenbaghŤ 
April 2018 
WP 2018/111 
 
www.ademu-project.eu/publications/working-papers  
Abstract 
 
We derive the optimal fiscal transfer scheme for countries in a monetary union to off-set the 
welfare losses resulting from asymmetric shocks and nominal rigidities. Optimal transfers involve 
a trade-off between reducing national output gaps and the provision of consumption insurance 
across countries, where the weight of the former increases relative to the latter as consumption 
home bias rises. The welfare gains from optimal transfers increase in both home bias and export 
substitutability. When these parameters are calibrated to the data for specific euro area countries, 
the welfare gains from optimal transfers are as high as 3.6% of permanent consumption. 
 
Keywords: Fiscal union; Currency union; Monetary union; Optimal fiscal policy. 
JEL codes: E50, E62, F41, F42, F45. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
† Florida State. Email: mdmitriev@fsu.edu. Web: http://www.mikhaildmitriev.org 
Ť Johns Hopkins. Email: hoddenbagh@jhu.edu Web: sites.google.com/site/jonathanhoddenbagh/  
 
  
 
 
Acknowledgments 
We thank seminar participants at a number of institutions for constructive feedback that improved 
the paper. This project is related to the research Agenda of the ADEMU project, “A Dynamic 
Economic and Monetary Union”, funded by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Program under 
grant agreement N° 649396 (ADEMU). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________ 
The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union 
funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396.  
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License Creative 
Commons Attribution 4.0 International, which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium 
provided that the original work is properly attributed. 
     
(A.11) to obtain
C
1
γ
F,ji = (1− α)−
1
ηCσi C
− 1
η
i C
1
η
H,iα
1
ηC−σj C
1
η
j C
− 1
η
F,j C
1
γ
F,j. (A.13)
Canceling out terms using the independence of C−σj C
1
η
j C
− 1
η
F,j from country j, we have
C
1
γ
F,ji = (1− α)−
1
ηC
− 1
η
F,i C
1
η
H,iα
1
ηC
1
γ
F,j. (A.14)
Take both sides of equation to the power of γ and obtain
CF,ji = (1− α)−
γ
ηC
− γ
η
F,i C
γ
η
H,iα
γ
ηCF,j. (A.15)
We compute exports from country i by integrating across the rest of the world consumption
∫ 1
0
CF,jidj:∫ 1
0
CF,jidj = (1− α)−
γ
ηC
− γ
η
F,i C
γ
η
H,iα
γ
η
∫ 1
0
CF,jdj. (A.16)
The equilibrium is characterized by the four equations below:
Yi = CH,i + (1− α)−
γ
ηC
− γ
η
F,i C
γ
η
H,iα
γ
η
∫ 1
0
CF,jdj, (A.17)
Ci =
[
(1− α) 1ηC
η−1
η
H,i + α
1
ηC
η−1
η
F,i
] η
η−1
, (A.18)
χY ϕi Z
1+ϕ
i = (1− α)
1
ηC−σi C
1
η
i C
− 1
η
H,i , (A.19)
Cσj α
− 1
ηC
− 1
η
j C
1
η
F,j = (1− α)−
1
η
(∫ 1
0
C
σ γ−1
γ
i C
− 1
η
γ−1
γ
i C
1
η
γ−1
γ
H,i di
) γ
γ−1
. (A.20)
To show that this allocation exactly corresponds to the exible wage, complete markets allocation
given in (21b) and (21a), we need to make corresponding changes from the exible wage allocation:
CH,i = (1− α)(PH,i/Pi)−ηCi, (A.21)
CF,i = α(PF,i/Pi)
−ηCi. (A.22)
Now we are ready to make the necessary substitution and obtain:
Yi = CH,i + (PH,i/PF,i)
−γ
∫ 1
0
CF,jdj, (A.23)
P 1−ηi = (1− α)P 1−ηH,i + αP 1−ηF,i , (A.24)
χY ϕi Z
1+ϕ
i = C
−σ
i (PH,i/Pi), (A.25)
Cσj Pj = (1− α)−
1
η
(∫ 1
0
C
σ γ−1
γ
i P
γ−1
γ
i P
− γ−1
γ
H,i di
) γ
γ−1
= constant, (A.26)
which exactly corresponds to the exible wage allocation given by (21a) and (21b).
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 2: The Decentralized StickyWage, IncompleteMarkets
Allocation
As in the text, we omit country i and time t subindices for the nominal wage W which is set one-
period-in-advance, as it will be identical across countries and across time. Goods market clearing
takes the following form:
Yit = (1− α)Cit
(
PH,it
Pit
)−η
+ αW−γZγitEt−1{CitP ηit}. (A.27)
In a monetary union, domestic exports from country i to the rest of the union are equal to
αP−γH,it
∫ 1
0
CF,jdj = αW
−γZγit
∫ 1
0
CitP
η
itdi = αW
−γZγitEt−1
{
CitP
η
it
}
.
Using the normalized foreign price index (PF,t = 1) we can rewrite the aggregate domestic price
index (15) as
P 1−ηit = (1− α)P 1−ηH,it + α, (A.28)
and using (A.28), the price of the domestic variety (15) and the aggregate resource constraint under
imperfect cross-country risk-sharing from (20), we can rewrite goods market clearing from (A.27)
as
Yit = (1− α)Yit
(
PH,it
Pit
)1−η
+ (1− α)Tit
Pit
(
PH,it
Pit
)−η
+ αP−γH,itEt−1{CitP ηit}.
Isolating output on the left hand side
Yit =
(1− α) Tit
Pit
(PH,it
Pit
)−η
+ αP−γH,itEt−1{CitP ηit}
1− (1− α)(PH,it
Pit
)1−η ,
we simplify the above expression and obtain
Yit = P
−γ
H,itP
1−η
it Et−1{CitP ηit}+
1− α
α
P−ηH,itTit. (A.29)
From (A.29) we solve for labor using domestic production (1) to substitute out Yit and we solve for
consumption using the aggregate resource constraint from (20) to substitute out Yit:
Nit = P
−γ
H,itP
1−η
it Z
−1
it Et−1{CitP ηit}+
1− α
α
P−ηH,itZ
−1
it Tit, (A.30)
Cit = P
1−γ
H,it P
−η
it Et−1{CitP ηit}+
1− α
α
P 1−ηH,it
Tit
Pit
+
Tit
Pit
. (A.31)
Simplifying the above expression for consumption
Cit = P
1−γ
H,it P
−η
it Et−1{CitP ηit}+
1
α
P−ηit Tit, (A.32)
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and solving for transfers in (A.32) yields:
Tit = αCitP ηit − αP 1−γH,itEt−1{CitP ηit}. (A.33)
We can also directly express labor as a function of consumption. In particular:
Cit − P 1−γH,it P−ηit Et−1{CitP ηit}
1
α
P−ηit
=
Nit − P−γH,itP 1−ηit Z−1it Et−1{CitP ηit}
1−α
α
P−ηH,itZ
−1
it
. (A.34)
After a few algebraic manipulations we get
Nit = (Cit − P 1−γH,it P−ηit Et−1{CitP ηit})(1− α)P−ηH,itZ−1it P ηit + P−γH,itP 1−ηit Z−1it Et−1{CitP ηit}. (A.35)
which can be simplied to:
Nit = (1− α)P−ηH,itZ−1it P ηitCit + αP−γH,itZ−1it Et−1{CitP ηit}.. (A.36)
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3: Optimal Transfers
In what follows we make use of the following relationships which hold in a monetary union:∫ 1
0
CF,jitdj = (PH,it/PF,t)
−γ
∫ 1
0
CF,jtdj = (PH,it/PF,t)
−γα
∫ 1
0
Cjt(PF,t/Pjt)
−ηdj = αP−γH,itEt−1{CjtP ηjt}.
In this section we also omit the subindex i. We combine the consumption allocation (27a) and labor
allocation (27b) from the decentralized, incomplete markets, stick wage equilibrium into (A.36). We
then formulate the policymaker’s Lagrangian for the optimal transfer scheme:
L =E0
{ ∞∑
t=1
βt
[
C1−σit
1− σ − χ
N1+ϕit
1 + ϕ
+ λit
(
Nit − (1− α)P−ηH,itZ−1it P ηitCit − αP−γH,itZ−1it Et−1{CitP ηit}
)
− λW
(
χEt−1{N1+ϕit } − (1− α)Et−1{C1−σit P 1−ηH,itP η−1it } − αEt−1{C−σit P 1−γH,it P−1it }Et−1{CitP ηit}
)]}
.
(A.37)
The rst order conditions with respect to consumption and labor are:
∂L
∂Cit
=C−σit − λit(1− α)P−ηH,itZ−1it P ηit − αEt−1{λitP−γH,itZ−1it }P ηit − λW (1− α)(1− σ)C−σit P 1−ηH,itP η−1it
+ αλWσC
−σ−1
it P
1−γ
H,it P
−1
it Et−1{CitP ηit} − αλWEt−1{C−σit P 1−γH,it P−1it }P ηit = 0, (A.38)
∂L
∂Nit
=− χNϕit + λit − λWχ(1 + ϕ)Nϕit = 0. (A.39)
We solve for λit using the rst order condition for labor (A.39), and substitute into the rst order
condition for consumption:
0 =C−σit − χ(1 + λW (1 + ϕ))Nϕit(1− α)P−ηH,itZ−1it P ηit
− αχ(1 + λW (1 + ϕ))E(NϕitP−γH,itZ−1it )P ηit − λW (1− α)(1− σ)C−σit P 1−ηH,itP η−1it
+ αλWσC
−σ−1
it P
1−γ
H,it P
−1
it E(CitP
η
it)− αλWE(C−σit P 1−γH,it P−1it )P ηit. (A.40)
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At the steady state the above equation becomes
0 =C−σ − χ(1 + λW (1 + ϕ))Nϕ(1− α)− αχ(1 + λW (1 + ϕ))Nϕ
− λW (1− α)(1− σ)C−σ + αλWσC−σ − αλWC−σ. (A.41)
We simplify the above expression to
0 = C−σ(1− λW (1− σ))− χ(1 + λW (1 + ϕ))Nϕ. (A.42)
and use the fact that C1−σ = χN1+ϕ and thus N = C in steady state:
1 + λW (1 + ϕ) = 1− λW (1− σ). (A.43)
Correspondingly, λW = 0. This allows us to simplify the rst order condition for consumption:
0 = C−σit − χNϕit(1− α)P−ηH,itZ−1it P ηit − αχE(NϕitP−γH,itZ−1it )P ηit. (A.44)
We log-linearize the simplied rst order condition for consumption (A.44) and use the fact that
expectations of all variables are equal to zero due to the independence of idiosyncratic shocks across
time and space. In particular,
0 = −σC−σCˆit − χNϕ(1− α)(ϕNˆit − ηPˆH,it − Zˆit + ηPˆit)− αχNϕηPˆit. (A.45)
We again use the steady state relationship C1−σ = χN1+ϕ and N = C , such that, C−σ = χNϕ.
Equation (A.45) simplies to
0 = −σCˆit − (1− α)(ϕNˆit − ηPˆH,it − Zˆit + ηPˆit)− αηPˆit, (A.46)
We simplify further and obtain
0 = σCˆit + (1− α)ϕNˆit − (1− α)Zˆit, (A.47)
which is equivalent to the linear combination of the labor and consumption wedges:
(1− α)VˆN,it + αVˆC,it = 0. (A.48)

B Global Closed-form Solution Under Zero Home Bias
B.1 Deriving the Allocations with Zero Home Bias
In this section we solve the model globally in closed-form for economies with zero home bias, where
1− α = 0. The global closed-form solution allows us to derive explicit expressions for welfare that
hold in any steady state, without any log-linearization.
Flexible Wages with Complete Markets: the Pareto Optimal Allocation
If we take the domestic consumption basket (6) to the limit as α → 1 and substitute the result
along with domestic production (1) directly into the household objective function (3), then we can
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reformulate the policymaker’s optimization problem as follows:10
max
∀cij
∫ 1
0
[(∫ 1
0
c
γ−1
γ
ij dj
) γ(1−σ)
γ−1
1− σ −
χ
1 + ϕ
(∫ 1
0
cjidj
Zi
)1+ϕ ]
di. (B.1)
The rst order condition with respect to cij is
0 =
(∫ 1
0
c
γ−1
γ
ij dj
) γ(1−σ)
γ−1 −1
c
− 1
γ
ij − χ
(∫ 1
0
cjidj
)ϕ
Z1+ϕj
. (B.2)
This is equivalent to
0 =
[(∫ 1
0
c
γ−1
γ
ij dj
) 1−σγ
γ−1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=C
1−σγ
γ
i
c
− 1
γ
ij − χ
(∫ 1
0
cjidj
Zj
)ϕ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Nϕj
1
Zj
⇒ 0 = C
1−σγ
γ
i c
− 1
γ
ij − χ
Nϕj
Zj
,
and solving for cij we have:
cij =
Zγj C
1−γσ
i
χγNγϕj
. (B.3)
The consumption basket in country i (Ci) can then be expressed as:
Ci =
(∫ 1
0
c
γ−1
γ
ij dj
) γ
γ−1
=
∫ 1
0
(
Zγj C
1−γσ
i
χγNγϕj
) γ−1
γ
dj

γ
γ−1
=
(
1
χ
) 1
σ
[∫ 1
0
(
Zj
Nϕj
)(γ−1)
dj
] 1
σ(γ−1)
.
(B.4)
So Ci does not depend on its own technology Zi. Now, let’s solve for labor Ni and output Yi.
Ni =
Yi
Zi
=
∫ 1
0
cjidj
Zi
=
∫ 1
0
(
Zγi C
1−γσ
j
χγNγϕi
)
dj
Zi
=
Zγ−1i
χγNγϕi
∫ 1
0
C1−γσj dj (B.5)
Since Ci = Cj = C for all i, j. So we can take Cj outside of the integral in (B.5) and solve for Ni:
Ni =
Zγ−1i C
1−γσ
j
χγNγϕi
⇒ Ni =
(
Zγ−1i C
1−γσ
χγ
) 1
1+γϕ
. (B.6)
10Note that this policymaker could be a central bank in a exible exchange rate regime.
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Substitute (B.6) back into the denition of the consumption basket (B.4), and solve for the consump-
tion basket C in each country, which will be identical:
C =
(
1
χ
) 1
σ

∫ 1
0
(Zγ−1j C1−γσ
χγ
) 1
1+γϕ
−(γ−1)ϕ Zγ−1j dj

1
σ(γ−1)
,
⇒ C = Ci =
(
1
χ
) 1
σ+ϕ
(∫ 1
0
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
j dj
) 1+γϕ
(σ+ϕ)(γ−1)
. (B.7)
Solve for labor and output by substituting (B.7) into (B.6) and Yi = NiZi respectively:
Ni =
(
1
χ
) 1
σ+ϕ
(∫ 1
0
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
j dj
) 1−γσ
(σ+ϕ)(γ−1)
Z
γ−1
1+γϕ
i , (B.8)
Yi =
(
1
χ
) 1
σ+ϕ
(∫ 1
0
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
j dj
) 1−γσ
(σ+ϕ)(γ−1)
Z
γ(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
i . (B.9)
This is the Pareto ecient allocation. Under cooperative subsidies it is identical to the exible wage
allocation.
Sticky Wage Allocations With No Home Bias
From (11) with no home bias and (15) we can compute labor using Yit = ZitNit:
Nit = AZ
γ−1
it . (B.10)
Given the above, consumption will be
Cit = Cwt = A
(∫ 1
0
Zγ−1it di
) γ
γ−1
. (B.11)
Using labor market clearing (13), and substituting in Yit, Cit, Nit expressed as functions ofA and Zit
from above, we nd:
1 =
(
χµε
1− τi
)
A1+ϕ
∫ 1
0
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
it di
A1−σ
(∫ 1
0
Z
(γ−1)
it di
) γ(1−σ)
γ−1
(B.12)
Now we can solve for A:
A =
(
χµε
1− τi
) −1
σ+ϕ
(∫ 1
0
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
it di
) −1
σ+ϕ
(∫ 1
0
Zγ−1it di
) γ
γ−1
(1−σ)
σ+ϕ
. (B.13)
Given this solution for the constant A, one can solve for Cit and Nit by substituting A into the
expressions above, resulting in (27a) forCit and (27b) forNit. The same exercise in nancial autarky
will yield the expressions for Cit and Nit. 
B.2 Welfare Results
Below, we outline the steps necessary to derive the expected utility functions contained in Section
4 of the paper. Here we only conduct the exercise for exible exchange rates in complete markets,
but following the steps presented here will also yield the expected utility functions for the other
allocations.
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Cflex,complete =
(
1− τi
χµε
) 1
σ+ϕ
(∫ 1
0
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
i di
) 1+γϕ
(γ−1)(σ+ϕ)
E {Uflex,complete} =
[
1
1− σ −
1− τi
µε(1 + ϕ)
]
E
{
C1−σflex,complete
}
=
[
1
1− σ −
1− τi
µε(1 + ϕ)
](
1− τi
χµε
) 1−σ
σ+ϕ
E

(∫ 1
0
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
i di
) (1+γϕ)(1−σ)
(γ−1)(σ+ϕ)

For normative analysis, we assume that technology is log-normally distributed and is independent
across time and across countries: logZit ∼ N(0, σ2Z). The expectation above can then be rewritten
as:
E

(∫ 1
0
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
i di
) (1+γϕ)(1−σ)
(γ−1)(σ+ϕ)
 = e[ (γ−1)(1+ϕ)1+γϕ ]2 (1+γϕ)(1−σ)(γ−1)(σ+ϕ) σ2Z = e (γ−1)(1+ϕ)2(1−σ)(1+γϕ)(σ+ϕ) σ2Z .
Now, we insert this expression back into the original equation and get:
E {Uflex,complete} =
[
1
1− σ −
1− τi
µε(1 + ϕ)
](
1− τi
χµε
) 1−σ
σ+ϕ
e
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)2(1−σ)
(1+γϕ)(σ+ϕ)
σ2Z .
Taking logarithms, we can rewrite the log of expected utility as:
logE {Uflex,complete} = log
[
1
1− σ −
1− τi
µε(1 + ϕ)
]
+
1− σ
σ + ϕ
log
(
1− τi
χµε
)
+
(γ − 1)(1 + ϕ)2(1− σ)
(1 + γϕ)(σ + ϕ)
σ2Z .
(B.14)
Calculating the expected utility for the other coalitions simply requires that one follow the steps
outlined here. Notice that when we calculate welfare dierences between allocations, the rst and
second terms on the right hand side of equation (B.14) will cancel out, leaving only the dierence
between the remaining term on the right hand side.
Using the expected utilities from (31a) – (31d), and the fact that any constant terms will cancel
out when subtracted from each other, we calculate the welfare dierences for four scenarios: (1)
complete markets vs. autarky for exible wages; (2) complete markets vs. autarky for xed wages;
(3) exible vs. xed wages for complete markets; and (4) exible vs. xed wages for autarky. When
comparing welfare across dierent allocations, it is important to keep in mind that as risk-aversion
decreases, (i.e. as σ → 1), the welfare dierences expressed in logarithms also decrease but the
absolute values of utility increase. In other words, when risk aversion is low, the welfare dier-
ences shown in (B.15a) – (B.15d) will shrink, but this does not mean that the welfare dierences are
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decreasing in absolute value.
logE {Uflex,complete} − logE {Uflex,autarky} = σ(γ − 1)
2(1− σ)(1 + ϕ)2
(σ + ϕ)(1 + γϕ)[1− σ + γ(σ + ϕ)]σ
2
Z (B.15a)
logE {Ufixed,complete} − logE {Ufixed,autarky} = σ(γ − 1)
2(1− σ)(1 + ϕ)
σ + ϕ
σ2Z (B.15b)
logE {Uflex,complete} − logE {Ufixed,complete} = γϕ
2(γ − 1)2(1− σ)(1 + ϕ)
(1 + γϕ)(σ + ϕ)
σ2Z (B.15c)
logE {Uflex,autarky} − logE {Ufixed,autarky} = (γ − 1)
2(1− σ)(1 + ϕ)[γ(σ + ϕ)− σ]
1 + γ(σ + ϕ)− σ σ
2
Z
(B.15d)
C Extended Model With Calvo Wage Rigidity And Non-Contingent Bonds
The extended model is identical to that described in Section (2) with two key dierences. First,
Calvo wage setting replaces one-period-in-advance wage setting. Second, we consider an additional
nancial market setup wherein countries may trade non-contingent bonds. In all other respects the
model remains unchanged: household utility is (3), the consumption basket is (6) and the import
basket is dened in (7), the price index is (8), the relative demand for home and foreign products is
(9) and (10) respectively, demand for country i’s good is (11) and goods market clearing for country
i’s unique variety is (12).
The introduction of a nominal non-contingent bond, Bit, that pays in units of the import bas-
ket CF,it dened in (7), will alter the household budget constraint from (4). In the bond economy,
households will maximize utility from (3) subject to the following budget constraint:
Cit(h) +
Bit(h)
Pit
= (1− τi)
(
Wit(h)
Pit(h)
)
Nit(h) +Dit(h) + Tit(h) + Γit(h) + (1 + it−1)
(
Bit−1(h)
Pit
)
.
(C.1)
Country i’s domestic interest rate iit equals the world interest rate i∗ plus a country specic interest
rate premium p() that is strictly increasing in the amount of debt Bit:
iit = i
∗ + p(Bit). (C.2)
Financial autarky is the case for which p goes to innity. The interest rate premium is necessary to
ensure stationarity.
The formulas for consumption in complete markets (from (A.6)), the bond economy, nancial
autarky, and nancial autarky under a transfer union are given below:
Cit =
E0 {
∑
βtYitPH,it}
E0
{∑
βt (Pit)
σ−1
σ
}P− 1σit (C.3a)
Cit =
YitPH,it
Pit
−Bit +Bit−1(1 + iit−1) (C.3b)
Cit =
YitPH,it
Pit
(C.3c)
Cit =
YitPH,it
Pit
+
Tit
Pit
(C.3d)
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Under Calvo, the aggregate wage in period t (Wit) is a weighted average of the optimal reset wage
(W˜it) and the previous period wage (Wit−1):
W 1−εit = (1− θW )W˜ 1−εit + θWW 1−εit−1 (C.4)
where θW is the fraction of households who are able to reset wages in each period. VW and V˜W
are auxiliary variables that we use to describe innite summations. The equations describing Calvo
wage setting are:
VW,it = N
1+ϕ
it + βθWEtVW,it+1 (C.5)
V˜W,it = C
−σ
it
Nit
Pit
+ βθW V˜W,it+1 (C.6)
W˜it = χ
ε
ε− 1
VW,it
V˜W,it
(C.7)
W 1−εit = (1− θW )W˜ 1−εit + θWW 1−εit−1 (C.8)
To compute welfare under nancial autarky, incomplete markets, complete markets and a transfer
union, we solve a second-order approximation of the model for each country assuming that the home
country is a small open economy and that the rest of the union is in the steady state. In this case the
calibration of parameters for other members of the union has no eect. The correct specication
yields the ergodic mean for the rest of the union. We compute the ergodic mean (assuming that
the rest of the union has an identical calibration to the small open economy, but faces asymmetric
shocks) and nd that it has no eect on optimal allocations or welfare analysis. Indeed, since we
consider only asymmetric shocks, and in the aggregate positive shocks cancel out negative shocks
across the union, it does not matter whether the rest of the union is at rest or experiences asymmetric
shocks. This is also true if we consider two economies rather than a continuum of small open
economies. The computation of the ergodic mean remains unaected, as positive shocks in the rest
of the union would cancel out with negative shocks for the home country, and the welfare results
should be robust in that respect.
To compute welfare for the optimal transfer union we numerically search over the optimal trans-
fers as a function of productivity shocks and then estimate the ergodic mean for welfare using second
order perturbation methods.
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